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Abstract 
The paper attempts to examine the nature and the extent of strategic entries of independent 
candidates in elections following FPTP rule. The paper observes that besides individual incentives of 
the candidates, a major factor behind the emergence of independents under FPTP systems could be 
the surreptitious strategic floating of such candidates by major political parties. Accordingly, the paper 
proposes to use the number of non-independent candidates in a constituency as a readily observable 
ex ante proxy for political fragmentation and hypothesizes a strong functional relationship between 
non-independent and independent candidates. Empirical results for all parliamentary elections in India 
since 1962 reveal that during the first four elections in our reference period (e.g., during 1962—1977), 
the relationship was weak, as many independent candidates during this period were regional feudal 
satraps who either participated in elections with Congress support or posed the only challenge to 
Congress in their locality. However, political fragmentation and bitter fight among political parties in 
India during the 1980s gave birth to a new class of independents whose entries into the elections 
were primarily strategic in nature, leading to a strong relationship between the above two variables 
during this period. 
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Strategic Entry and the Relationship between Number of 
Independent and Non-Independent Candidates:  
A Study of Parliamentary Elections in India 
 
  
1 Introduction 
It is well known that the decision of a candidate to enter an election can affect the outcome 
of the election even if the candidate is not the winner. In case of first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
voting rule where even a single vote could make the difference between the winner and the 
losers, the motive for strategic entry could be just to influence the result. Recent advances in 
the literature have, however, established that the incentives for strategic entry may exist in 
case of every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity (Dutta et al, 2001). As 
these results demonstrate the importance of strategic entry, a natural question to ask is: 
what are its determinants, and, how they evolve over space and time. 
Despite theoretical advances, empirical evidence on strategic entry is comparatively rare. 
Theoretical results on strategic entry are generally with respect to a single constituency. In 
contrast, the real-life decision of strategic entry could be more complex. For example, major 
political parties in a country may willingly enter in certain constituencies knowing full well that 
they will not win, but proving that their entry is strategic could be difficult. Further, major 
political parties might be interested in the so called big picture across space and over time 
and in that big picture, a constituency could often be merely a cog in a wheel.  
In this paper we argue that independent candidates provide an ideal study material for 
strategic entry. Without the institutional support of a political party, independent candidates 
not only have to bear the risk of losing, but often also have to bear the risk of forfeiture of 
deposit. In many instances, they actually do so. Therefore, a natural question to ask is: what 
are the incentives of independent candidates? In this paper, we attempt to explain the 
reasons behind the emergence of independent candidates and from that attempt to identify 
factors that could affect their strategic entry.  In particular, we ask: what type of political 
environments over time and what type of constituencies over space induce strategic entry of 
individuals as independent candidates.  
In an ideal world, independents would hold a centrist viewpoint in a relatively polarized 
political environment. They may also have a viewpoint on specific issues or policies. 
Therefore, one reason for their taking part in electoral politics could be grievance against 
existing politicians and/or policies.  Independent candidates could also be a former member 
of a political party and stand in election as rebels. A third category of independents are those 
who may support a political party but believe that they should not formally commit to be its 
member. Fourth category could be free-riders who, by paying a limited cost, enjoy and utilize 
the free publicity that elections offer them. Finally, independent candidates could also be 
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cranks who run for idiosyncratic reasons (Canon, 1993).1 It may be noted that other than the 
last two categories, the major motive of independent candidates could be to influence the 
outcome through participation. In the long-run, such candidates also have the incentive to 
engage in bargaining with the mainstream political parties and cut a deal with one of them.  
The literature on political economy has discussed the problem of emergence of new political 
parties extensively and studied it with three different approaches. In the first approach, 
authors typically focus on institutional and systemic features, e.g., electoral laws and 
thresholds, requirements for registration or public party finance (Harmel and Robertson 
1985; Hug 2000). The second approach is a sociological one where authors study the 
transformation of the so called ‗cleavages‘ (Inglehart 1997). The third approach focuses on 
political opportunity, and typically studies the level of polarisation or convergence of political 
parties (Pennings and Keman, 2003). It may, however, be noted that results in this direction 
are often based on extensions of the simple median voter framework. For example, if the 
distribution reflecting voters‘ preference is highly heterogeneous, one reason of the 
emergence of smaller parties and independent candidates would be to fill up ideological 
vacuums created by major party competition (Rosenstone et al, 1996). However, as 
Osborne (1995) observes, when information is imperfect, theoretical results are unclear 
(Osborne, 1995). Incidentally, although emergence of small parties and independents are 
related phenomena, they may not be treated as one and the same. Unfortunately, neither 
standard voting theories nor the existing theories of coalition formation in democracies 
provide clear and unambiguous characterization of situations that would lead to strategic 
entry of independent candidates in elections. 
In the context of the US, recently Lem and Dowling (2006) specified a Negative Binomial 
regression model that attempts to explain the emergence of smaller parties and independent 
candidates in gubernatorial elections. Their study identifies several factors (e.g., political 
competition, constituency size, population density, legal and institutional hurdles across 
States etc.) that explain the emergence of independent candidates. One of the most 
important factors identified by them is political competition. However, the various measures 
of political competition used by Lem and Dowling (2006) are all ex post measures. When 
one uses such measures, the implicit assumption is that individuals predict the actual 
outcome of an election accurately. In real life, electoral outcomes in many cases involve 
surprises. Ideally, one should, therefore, use ex ante measures of political competition. 
More importantly, Lem and Dowling (2006) did not address the complex strategic interaction 
among mainstream political parties and independent candidates in sufficient detail. Such 
interactions might have important implications for all democracies, especially those with 
weak institutions and a heterogeneous population. For example, Bhattacharya (2010) argues 
that independent candidates could be dummies floated by political parties themselves to 
gain electoral advantage.2 FPTP electoral systems are likely to be more vulnerable to this 
                                                          
1
 Theoretically, there could be a method in madness. In economies with weak institutional structure, a 
―crank‖ may run as independent (i) if the transaction cost of running as independent is low compared 
to  ―donations‖ expected from him by the existing political parties, or, (ii) to avoid the ―hazards‖ of 
anticipated election duties.  
2
 That mainstream political parties have incentives to float dummy independent candidates has been 
recognized for a long time (McKnight, 1999). Bhattacharya (2010) identifies two major incentives: (i) 
the dummies floated by political parties could be ―clones‖ of its major rivals, the underlying idea being 
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type of electoral behavior because in such systems, difference of even a few votes may turn 
out to be crucial.  
In this paper, we observe that the surreptitious floating of independent candidates could lead 
to a prisoners‘ dilemma type game involving all major political parties. Standard results in 
game theory indicate that they are more likely to start in a fragmented polity because in such 
a situation all political parties have incentives to float dummies. Clearly, in such situations, 
the number of independent candidates in constituencies is expected to have a strong 
positive association with number of non-independent candidates. Accordingly, one of our 
important observations is that the number of non-independent candidates itself could be a 
proxy for political competition and an important determinant of strategic entry of 
independents. Though the measure implicitly attaches equal importance to all such 
candidates, its strong point is its widespread (and in almost all cases unrivalled) ex ante 
availability. In fact, the functional relationship between non-independent and independent 
candidates across space and the evolution of the relationship over time could give us 
valuable clues about the nature and the extent of strategic entries in elections.  
Common sense suggests that for potential applications of this theory, one should study 
voting patterns of developing and emerging market economies rather than developed 
countries with relatively stronger institutional structure and with two major political parties 
already in place. In this paper, we study the parliamentary elections in India. To convince 
readers, we now argue why India would be a good case study. In terms of scale of 
operation, logistics and active involvement of number of people, Indian parliamentary 
election is one of the biggest events in the world. Election of the lower house (Lok Sabha) of 
the parliament in India is carried out under FPTP rule. Since independence in 1947, Lok 
Sabha elections have been held in India fifteen times. However, even with more than sixty 
years of democratic experience, a clear bi-party system is yet to emerge in India at the 
central level.  
Because of its lack of an effective bi-party system at the central level, India would be a good 
case to examine the role political fragmentation plays in the emergence of independent 
candidates. Being a large country with a lot of diversities, it is no surprise that different parts 
of India react differently to parliamentary elections. While many smaller units like States 
show signs of emergence of a bi-party system, politics at the central level in India is still 
guided by complex political coalitions involving both national and regional parties.   
In the Indian context, there are several benchmark studies on party system and coalition 
making. In an early and seminal study, Kothari (1970) identified some of the specialties and 
complexities of the Indian political process. Studies like Weiner (1978) analyzed the socio-
political implications of the benchmark 1977 Lok Sabha election in India.  Subsequent 
studies like Mitra and Singh (1999) and Chhibber (1999) have examined the linkage 
between social cleavages and political parties and their gradual changes over time. These 
later studies attempt to explain the complex coalition politics in India in terms of multiple 
cleavages like caste, religion, language, region and social and economic classes. However, 
besides the relational dynamics of different political parties in India over space and time, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to confuse voters intending to vote for its rivals, and, (ii) floating independents may also help parties to 
have additional electoral agents in different polling booths in a constituency. Besides these, floating 
pliant independents as dummies enables political parties to divert electoral expenditure through them. 
  
4 
major feature of Indian parliamentary elections is the large number of independent 
candidates. None of these studies offer a systematic explanation of this phenomenon.3 This 
is surprising because common sense suggests that when coalition governance is the order 
of the day, that governance structure may itself lead to participation of too many independent 
candidates and, in turn, enhance the complexity of political management. 
This paper attempts to provide a systematic examination of the relationship between non-
independent and independent candidates in India across constituencies and over time. In 
the specific context of India, political importance of independent candidates has varied 
substantially over the years. Table A.1 in Appendix A provides the number of seats won by 
independent candidates as a group and their share of votes. Table A.1 reveals that in the 
Lok Sabha elections in 1962 and and 1967 in India, independent candidates won 20 and 35 
seats respectively. However, since 1970s, number of seats won by independent candidates 
decreased substantially. Interestingly, the share of votes of independent candidates 
remained consistently high in all parliamentary elections. Independents as a group 
consistently obtained more than 4.0 per cent of total votes polled in all parliamentary 
elections, except in 1998 and 1999 when it fell to 2.4 and 2.7 per cents respectively.  
To judge the real significance of the strategic entries of independent candidates, we 
compute two additional measures: (i) the number of constituencies in an election where a 
single independent candidate got more votes than the margin of victory in a constituency 
(INFLUENCE1), and, (ii) the number of constituencies where independent candidates as a 
group got more votes than the margin of victory (INFLUENCE2). The high magnitudes of 
both INFLUENCE1 and INFLUENCE2 in Table A.1 for different parliamentary elections 
clearly reveal that independent candidates, both individually and as a group, played an 
important role in the electoral dynamics in India. Interestingly, even during 1998 and 1999, 
the values for INFLUENCE1 was 60 and 64 and those for INFLUENCE2, 55 and 74 
respectively, e.g., more than 10.0 per cent of the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha. 
Given the importance of independent candidates in the Indian context, the paper studies the 
evolution of the functional relationship between non-independent and independent 
candidates in India across constituencies and over time.  The plan of the paper is as follows: 
Section 2 presents the analytical framework. Section 3 discusses the data and carries out 
the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main findings, identifies some 
limitations of this study and suggests a few possible generalizations.  
 
2 The Analytical Framework 
Suppose there are N voters in a constituency (say, C), with K candidates. Each voter votes 
for each of the candidates with equal probability (e.g., 1/K) and this information is known to 
all voters and candidates. In FPTP electoral systems, the candidate with the highest vote will 
be elected. Let MK be the expected victory margin. In such a case, an individual P who 
                                                          
3
 To put the lack of discussion on this area in perspective, we note that the very word ―Independent‖ is 
not present in the ―Index‖ part of the books of Kothari (1970),  Mitra and Singh (1999) and Chhibber 
(1999). Weiner (1978) too has discussed this aspect scantily, observing that ―In any event, the 
number of votes received by most independent candidates was very small, often only 1 or 2 per cent 
of the total vote‖ (p. 83).  
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expects to have at least MK votes may participate as an independent candidate in the 
election. It may be noted that for P, the primary motive behind entry could be strategic in 
nature. Although P knows that he will not win, he can still influence who the winner is by 
simply participating in the election. P, therefore, has incentive to enter the fray, the objective 
being to bargain with the major parties and extract rent out of this process. Let n(MK) be the 
number of persons in the constituency who expect to have at least MK votes. Clearly, as K 
increases, MK decreases. Therefore, n(MK) is an increasing function of K. 
Common sense, therefore, suggests that with more political fragmentation in an FPTP 
electoral system, more independent candidates are likely to emerge. While each major 
political party may represent a relatively large cleavage in the economy, smaller parties and 
independent candidates typically represents smaller cleavages. With more fragmentation in 
the polity, these smaller cleavages might take visible shapes during the time of the election 
in the forms of smaller parties and independent candidates.  
To appreciate this aspect of strategic entry, we carried out a simulation exercise with 10,000 
voters and K (K=2,3, …, 10) candidates where each vote goes to the candidates with equal 
probability for different values of K. For each value of K, elections were repeated 100 times 
and the average victory margin in these 100 elections was computed as an estimate of the 
expected victory margin with K equal candidates.   
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Figure 1: Expected Victory Margin as Share of Total Votes Polled
(When Each Voter Votes for Each Candidate With Equal Probability)
Total Number of Voters (N) = 10,000 
 
 
Figure 1 plots the expected victory margin (as a proportion of total votes) for different values 
of K. Figure 1 clearly reveals a fall in the expected victory margin as K starts to increase. 
Figure 1, therefore, highlights the individual incentives behind strategic entry.   For example, 
it reveals that in case of a direct electoral battle between two candidates, where each of the 
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10,000 voters votes for both the candidates with equal probability, the expected victory 
margin is about 79 only. Therefore, a third candidate with only 80 confirmed supporters 
could, on an average, influence the result of the election decisively. Naturally, this third 
candidate cannot be the ―king‖, but could be the ―king maker‖. 
It is observed that in a FPTP system, besides individuals, established political parties also 
have incentives to float independent candidates, especially in situations where the fight is 
close (Bhattacharya, 2010). To appreciate why, suppose there are two political parties (say, 
P1 and P2) fighting in an election in a constituency (say, C). Suppose, both P1 and P2 
perceive that they have equal chance of winning the election, e.g., each party assumes that 
in a direct contest, each of the voters will vote for both the candidates with probability (1/2). 
Both parties now realize that if they float one or more independent candidates cloning its 
rival, each voter will then vote for each such independent candidate with a small probability  
at the cost of its rival. Both parties, therefore, have incentive to compete with each other to 
float more independent candidates than the rival, subject to the resources available to them.  
This entire process of floating clone independent candidates may be thought of as a 
Prisoners‘ Dilemma type game. The game is simultaneous because although in principle, 
each party can observe what the other one is doing for some time, crucial adjustments are 
likely to take place only at the last moment of filing nomination. Extending the logic of 
Prisoners‘ Dilemma, we can immediately see that any tacit understanding between the 
political parties is likely to be unstable. The incentive to ―cheat‖ is strong, especially in 
political games of this type which is repeated infrequently and where the stake is high. 
Further, even if a tacit pact is there, if a free rider decides to take advantage of his/her 
similarity with one of the candidates, the fragile pact may break down due to 
misunderstanding. Interestingly, with three or more political parties having equal strength, 
the situation becomes more complex. To win, each political party will now have to field 
independent candidates against all its rivals. Like in the classical Prisoners‘ Dilemma with 
multiple players, detection of the cheater becomes more difficult because even if ―clones‖ 
are identified, one may not know which political party has floated the clone. 
We now discuss some practical implications of this insight. It may be noted that although in 
theory, each political party has incentives to field independent candidates against one 
another, in reality cloning may not take place at all. For example, if the parties have unequal 
strength in a constituency and both perceive that cloning is unlikely to change the outcome, 
then none of the parties have incentive to float clones. Political parties may also have 
unequal resources to take part in this game. In reality, the case of more than two political 
parties having equal real or perceived strength in a constituency is also rare. Therefore, our 
model cannot suggest an exact functional relationship between the number of non-
independent and independent candidates other than that the last is an increasing function of 
the first.  
In this context, there are two important observations. First, unlike Lem and Dowling (2006), 
constituency size does not play any role in our model. Rather, the important roles are played 
by the number of non-independent candidates in fray. An observable implication of the 
model is that ceteris paribus, number of independent candidates will be unaffected by 
constituency size, but will have an increasing relationship with the number of independent 
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candidates. Second, our analytical framework cannot distinguish the actual motive of 
strategic entry, e.g., whether the entrant is a free-rider with individual objective or whether 
the entrant is a stooge of a political party. Whatever be the objective of the entrant, theory 
however, dictates that it will be positively related to political fragmentation. 
Formally, let Xi and Yi be the number of non-independent and independent candidates in 
constituency i. Then, assuming a linear specification, 
(1)      Yi =  +  Xi + i  
where i ‗s are iid disturbance terms,  with E( i) =0 and Var( i) = 
2 and,  and  are 
parameters. It may, however, be noted that here both Xi and Yi are integer valued variables. 
Therefore, i s could be non-normal.  
Now suppose we focus on the variation in average number of independent candidates for 
constituencies with specific number of non-independent candidates. Suppose there are nj 
number of constituencies with j non-independent candidates in an election. Then, averaging: 
 ...,2,1,0)2( jjY jj  
 where 
in
i
i
j
j
n 1
1
. Clearly, 0)(E j  and 
21)(VAR
j
j
n
.  
Note that equation (2) may be estimated by weighted least squares (WLS). Further, if nj ‗s 
are large, then the probability distribution of the error term can be approximated by normal 
distribution and the standard results on testing of hypotheses under OLS/GLS will apply. 
In this context, on a more general note, IND may not just be affected by NONIND but by 
many other variables. For example, IND may depend upon the urbanization or the 
reservation status of a constituency. It may also depend upon whether a candidate fighting in 
a constituency could be interpreted as a VIP or a celebrity (Bhattacharya, 2010). Therefore, 
a more general linear specification could be  
(3)     Yi =  +  Xi + Zi  + i  
where Zi is a vector of other variables and  is the corresponding parameter vector. It may be 
noted that if these other factors are well distributed across constituencies and have very low 
correlation with NONIND, then the model effectively reduces to that in (2).  
  
3 Data and Empirical Analysis 
The data for this paper have been downloaded and compiled from the website of the 
Election Commission of India (ECI) [http://www.eci.gov.in]. The ECI website contains 
detailed results of all constituencies for all parliamentary elections in India. In this study, we 
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focus on parliamentary elections since the year 1962, excluding by-elections.4 Since 1962, 
thirteen parliamentary elections were held in India in the years 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 
1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 respectively. It may be noted 
that at the time of these pan-India elections, sometimes elections in a few States in India 
were postponed due to charged atmosphere. Elections in these states were held 
subsequently (e.g., Punjab and Assam in 1985 and Punjab in 1992). We have consciously 
omitted the data on elections for these States because once the members to the parliament 
(MPs) are elected and the government is formed, the political milieu in a particular State 
where election is held subsequently changes sharply from the time of general election.  In 
fact, these state-level parliamentary elections are conceptually similar to extended versions 
of by-elections. 
For each constituency in each parliamentary election, the name, sex, political affiliation and 
the number of votes obtained by each candidate have been recorded.5 In some cases, a 
constituency itself is declared a reserve constituency – sometimes for candidates belonging 
to scheduled castes (SC) and sometimes for those belonging to scheduled tribes (ST). 
A conceptual difficulty encountered here is to define independent candidates empirically. 
This is because many bizarre candidates stand in Indian elections under the garb of a 
political party.6 For example, during the year 2004, the Election Commission publications list 
173 parties categorized as ―Registered (Unrecognised) Parties‖, sometimes with strange 
names like Bharatiya Muhabbat Party (All India) or Vijeta Party. Together, these 173 parties 
fielded a total of 898 candidates in the parliamentary election of 2004. 7 Barring a few 
exceptions, majority of them did not join any coalition involving National or State parties. 
Further, many of them floated candidates in a single constituency only. Overwhelming 
majority of these candidates behaved like independent candidates. However, as economic 
or political theories do not provide clear answer to their status, in this paper we define 
independent candidates as per official Election Commission categorization.  
Table 1 compares the statistical features of independent (IND), non-independent (NONIND) 
and total number of candidates (TOTCAN) per constituency separately for all parliamentary 
elections in India during the reference period. From Table 1, one can observe the evolution 
of the relationship between independent and non-independent candidates in parliamentary 
elections. Table 1 helps us to we identify four major phases in the relationship. The first 
phase is the period 1962–1977. In this phase, mean of IND was generally lower than that for 
NONIND. These two variables became approximately equal for the first time in 1977.  
 
                                                          
4
 Although data on parliamentary elections for the year 1951 and 1957 are available in the public 
domain, these two elections did not follow first-past-the-post electoral rule for all constituencies. 
5
 Since 2004, data on age and caste for each parliamentary candidate are also available. 
6 The situation is not unique in case of India. Bizarre candidates stood under such labels as BELLS 
(Ban Every Licensing Law Society) or SBILP (Southport Back in Lancashire Party) in the 1983 
parliamentary election in the United Kingdom and could actually manage to get 75 and 374 votes 
respectively (Moores, 1987). 
7
 Individually, only 8 among these 173 parties managed to get more than 0.10% of the total votes 
polled in the 2004 election.   
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It is well recognized that the 1977 parliamentary election was a benchmark election in India 
and studied extensively by political scientists like Weiner (1978). The election itself took 
place against the backdrop of emergency imposed by the Congress government under the 
leadership of Indira Gandhi. For the first time in India since its independence, an effective 
coalition against Congress was formed in this election under the moral guidance of 
Jayaprakash Narayan. As a result, the mean of NONIND in 1977 was only 2.24, the lowest 
among all parliamentary elections in India during the reference period. It may be noted that a 
value of NONIND equal to 2.0 implies a direct fight between two major political parties. The 
relatively more direct fight in 1977 resulted in electoral defeat of the Congress for the first 
time in India since independence.  
The second phase consisting of 1980–1984 is the period of a single party dominance 
against a fragmented opposition in India. A consequence of the fragmented opposition was 
more non-independent candidates in constituencies (compared to 1977) leading to more 
independent candidates per constituency as well. 
The third phase consists of 1989–1996. This period is largely recognised as a period of 
political uncertainty in India. A single party dominance at the central level being over, efforts 
were concentrated in coalition formation. All major political parties in India, whether in power 
or in the opposition, participated in this process actively. As a result, this was the time in 
India when regional political satraps started to play more and more dominant roles in 
coalition formation. Although attempts were made by all national level parties to bring them 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
             
Statistic 
YEAR 
1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
Mean 
IND 0.97 1.67 2.19 2.26 5.34 7.38 7.02 10.58 19.59 3.546 3.60 4.39 7.05 
NONIND 3.04 2.89 3.19 2.24 3.41 2.96 4.63 6.05 6.11 5.25 5.01 5.62 7.81 
TOTCAN 4.01 4.56 5.38 4.50 8.75 10.33 11.64 16.64 25.69 8.80 8.61 10.01 14.86 
Variance 
IND 1.50 3.11 4.51 4.45 23.57 37.15 65.31 93.99 905.98 11.26 11.64 14.21 27.40 
NONIND 1.39 1.21 1.70 0.38 0.98 1.17 2.82 4.90 8.28 4.373 4.04 5.05 8.04 
TOTCAN 2.56 4.44 6.81 5.07 27.16 41.47 75.90 123.08 959.67 18.94 20.32 24.15 45.10 
Skewness 
IND 1.71 1.56 1.53 1.22 1.90 1.76 5.97 2.53 11.84 2.07 1.86 1.89 1.36 
NONIND 0.60 0.54 1.05 1.37 0.48 0.95 0.68 1.90 2.45 1.381 1.22 1.04 0.77 
TOTCAN 1.09 1.24 1.31 1.19 1.82 1.56 4.94 2.70 10.92 1.40 1.42 1.30 1.06 
Kurtosis 
IND 3.32 2.98 3.05 1.87 5.03 4.24 68.80 10.24 171.34 8.236 5.51 6.74 2.53 
NONIND 0.17 0.10 2.32 3.01 0.68 0.42 1.00 9.77 11.33 3.065 1.88 1.56 0.85 
TOTCAN 1.70 2.05 2.02 1.63 4.51 3.42 50.20 12.61 152.53 3.025 2.70 3.04 1.70 
Minimum 
IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NONIND 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 
TOTCAN 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Maximum 
IND 6 10 12 12 35 40 118 81 473 29 24 30 32 
NONIND 7 7 9 5 7 7 12 24 28 16 14 16 21 
TOTCAN 11 14 16 14 39 42 122 105 480 34 32 35 43 
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under one political umbrella, such attempts did not lead to political stability due to the 
heterogeneities in the incentives of the players involved.8 Due to the political fragmentation 
and uncertainty at the central level, a relatively sharper increase in the number of 
independent candidates is observed during this period. 
In the fourth and the final phase of 1998–2009, political uncertainty and the process of 
coalition formation continued. However, effective institutional intervention through the 
election commission sharply reduced the number of candidates in elections, especially the 
independent ones.  During early years of Indian democracy, the high number of independent 
candidates in an election used to cost the public exchequer in India severely.9 Other costs 
like security costs were also high. If for example, an independent candidate died (or, was 
murdered), election in that constituency would be postponed. In a politically volatile or 
charged atmosphere, such a situation – though infrequent – happened in India.10 Because of 
these institutional weaknesses, during the 1996 parliamentary election in India, a total of 
10,635 independent candidates appeared in a total of 543 parliamentary seats. Electoral 
reforms and the use of electronic voting machines led to a decrease in independent 
candidates subsequently. Despite these policies, however, one observes an increasing trend 
in the mean of IND since 1998, the rate of increase being relatively sharper than that of 
NONIND. 
Interestingly, Table 1 reveals that although the mean level of IND varied substantially across 
political phases, variation in IND was consistently higher than that of NONIND. Further, 
except the election in 1977, skewness and kurtosis were also higher for IND than for 
NONIND. Clearly, the political mobilization against Congress rule and the consequent 
coalition formation by the opposition in 1977 was a dampening factor for strategic entries of 
independent candidates.  
Together, these facts imply that strategic entry of independent candidates depend on the 
level of political fragmentation at the time of an election. Interestingly, the correlation 
between means of IND and NONIND over time (e.g., across elections) is 0.54. Further, in 
case of a particular parliamentary election independent candidates typically target specific 
constituencies. 
Table 1 also throws hints about the important role played by electoral institutions in India. 
During early years of Indian democracy, the high number of independent candidates in an 
                                                          
8
 For example, the so called Third Front was an effort in this direction. 
9
 For example, during the assembly election in Tamil Nadu, India, in 1996, Modaurichi assembly 
constituency had 1033 candidates.  During Parliamentary elections in the same year, Nalgonda 
constituency in Andhra Pradesh and Belgaum constituency in Karnataka had 480 and 456 candidates 
respectively. In each of these cases, overwhelming majority were independent candidates. Election 
Commission of India was forced to print ballot booklets instead of ballot papers. 
10
 In the parliament polls of 1985, Palakondarayudu, the candidate of Telugu Desam at Raychoti in 
Cuddapah district, Andhra Pradesh, was unsure of the support of the two main local factions. So, 
allegedly he got the election postponed by killing Guvvala Subbarayudu, an independent candidate. 
He thus gained time to rope in the two factions, and succeeded in winning the election held later. In 
1989, polls were held simultaneously for assembly and parliament in Andhra Pradesh. 
Palakondarayudu was this time a candidate for the assembly. Apprehensive that he may repeat his 
victorious performance, Nagi Reddy, his main opposition, set up a pliant man of their own faction, 
Avula Subba Reddy by name, as an independent candidate. To get the election postponed, Nagi 
Reddy allegedly have him killed the day before the election (Balagopal, 2004). 
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election used to cost the public exchequer in India severely.11 Other costs like security costs 
were also high. If for example, an independent candidate died (or, was murdered), election 
in that constituency would be postponed. In a politically volatile or charged atmosphere, such 
a situation – though infrequent – happened in India.12 Because of these institutional 
weaknesses, during the 1996 parliamentary election in India, a total of 10,635 independent 
candidates appeared in a total of 543 parliamentary seats. Electoral reforms and the use of 
electronic voting machines led to a decrease in independent candidates subsequently. Still, 
Lok Sabha elections in 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 had 1,915, 1,945, 2,385 and 3829 
independent candidates respectively. These numbers are high, especially if one considers 
one of the earliest democracies like the United Kingdom as benchmark;13 and importantly, 
since 1998 they reflect an increasing trend. 
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 The number of independent candidates in the 2005 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom 
was only 162 for a total of 646 seats. 
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Figure 2 presents the movement of the ratio of independent and non-independent 
candidates. Figure 2 depicts a roller-coaster movement of the ratio. The ratio increased 
steadily till 1984. It had a sharp fall in the year 1989. After that it rose once again till 1996, 
had another sharp fall in 1998 and showed a slightly increasing trend since then. Clearly, the 
sharp fall in 1998 could be attributed to the institutional intervention of ECI. An explanation 
for the fall in 1989 is more challenging. It may be noted that 1989 was the start of the period 
of active coalition politics in India. In a politically fragmented atmosphere, both the ruling 
parties and the parties in opposition were fighting bitterly for political space. As a result, 
compared to 1984, NONIND rose sharply from 2.96 to 4.63 in 1989 whereas IND fell from 
7.38 to 7.02. In many ways, 1989 and 1991 were the learning period for political parties 
about their relative strengths. 
 
 
Figure 3:
Scatter Diagram of Average Number of Independent Candidates across Non-Independent Candidates for Different Parliamentary Elections
Year: 1962
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Year: 1971
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
Year: 1967
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Year: 1977
1 2 3 4 5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
  
13 
 
Figure 3 plots the average number of independent candidates for constituencies with specific 
number of non-independent candidates separately for all the elections. It may be noted that 
in Figure 3, the points had unequal weights. However, despite this, Figure 3 depicts the 
evolution of the relationship between the two variables clearly. Initially, between 1962 and 
1977, the relationship had been weak. However, since the 1980s, the relationship appears to 
be strong. Further, the graphs, especially those since the 1980s, indicate that the linear 
specification of the relationship between independent and non-independent candidates in 
Section 2 would be a good starting point for model specification.  
Figure 3 (Continued):
Scatter Diagram of Average Number of Independent Candidates across Non-Independent Candidates for Different parliamentary Elections
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The estimated regression equations for each parliamentary election are presented in 
Table 2. Table 2 shows the evolution of the relationship over the years. During the 1960s, 
the relationship between the two variables was weak and virtually non-existent. During the 
1970s, the strength of the relationship increased. However, even during the 1970s, the 
coefficients for non-independent candidates in the regressions were not statistically 
significant.  This is because many independent candidates during this period were local 
feudal who either posed the only challenge to Congress or participated in elections with 
Congress support. During the benchmark election of 1977, the first formidable coalition 
against congress was formed. However, the coalition was not stable. The consequent 
political fragmentation that started during the 1980s gave birth to a new class of 
independents whose entries into the elections were strategic in nature leading to a very 
strong relationship between non-independent and independent candidates. We observe that 
since the 1980s, R2 in all regression relationships were consistently above 0.70 with strongly 
significant slope coefficients. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Different Parliamentary Elections 
             
  
YEAR 
1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
Intercept 
( ) 
1.32 
(3.13)# 
1.52 
(3.09)# 
1.62 
(5.02)# 
1.55 
(3.59)# 
0.82 
(1.35) 
3.40 
(6.97)# 
0.63 
(0.62) 
-4.36 
(-1.86)@ 
2.84 
(1.48) 
1.56 
(3.85)# 
0.72 
(2.12)@ 
1.68 
(3.91)# 
2.36 
(2.82)$ 
Slope 
( ) 
-0.12 
(–0.90) 
0.05 
(0.32) 
0.18 
(1.92)@ 
0.32 
(1.71) 
1.33 
(7.78)# 
1.35 
(8.69)# 
1.38 
(6.66)# 
2.47 
(6.81)# 
2.74 
(9.65)# 
0.38 
(5.25)# 
0.58 
(9.12)# 
0.48 
(6.82)# 
0.60 
(5.94)# 
R
2
 0.14 0.02 0.35 0.49 0.92 0.94 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.70 
Notes:  
(1) The bracketed numbers are t-statistics.  
(2) Here, #, $ and @ indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
 
 
The Indian experience also proves the important role policy intervention can play in the 
emergence of independent candidates. The fact that the number of independents dropped 
sharply since 1998 can only be explained in terms of the interventions by the Election 
Commission of India that increased the transaction costs of participation. Interestingly, 
despite the decrease in the number of independent candidates per constituency, the nature 
of the strategic entry has persisted, the relationship appears between non-independent and 
independent candidates still appear to be strong.  
Interestingly, the intercept terms in the regression show good degree of stability during 
1962—1977. Since the 1980s, however, the intercept coefficients fluctuate a lot. The 
variability is also observed in statistical significance of the observed coefficients. The 
intercept terms are significant not in 1980, 1989 and 1996. Further, during 1991, 1999 and 
2009, the significances were a bit weak.  
To capture the variation of independent candidates per constituency (IND) over time, we run 
a few regressions. The purpose behind these regressions is to compare the explanatory 
power of ex ante measures of political competition to more traditional ex post measures. As 
ex ante measure, we choose the number of non-independent candidates per constituency 
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(NONIND). Ex-post measures, in contrast are: (i) average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI_AV) based on vote shares, (ii) average margin as percentage of average number of 
votes in a constituency (MARGIN). Table 3 presents the regression results. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results across Different Parliamentary Elections 
  
Dependent Variable: IND 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
Intercept 
-1.4892 
(–0.41) 
0.4028 
(0.19) 
25.5201 
(1.93)@ 
11.1086 
(1.25) 
9.3928 
(2.36)$ 
6.4559 
(2.66)$ 
NONIND 
1.6315 
(2.16)$ 
0.9822 
(2.17)$ ––– ––– ––– ––– 
HHI_AV ––– ––– 
-49.6505 
(–1.50) 
-16.0676 
(–0.73) 
––– ––– 
MARGIN ––– ––– ––– ––– 
–0.2319 
(–0.96) 
–0.1139 
(–0.14) 
D96 ––– 
13.1865 
(4.86)# 
––– 
14.0720 
(3.27)# 
––– 
14.4950 
(3.10)# 
  0.23 0.75 0.09 0.65 0.00 0.65 
Notes:  
(1) The bracketed numbers are t-statistics.  
(2) Here, #, $ and @ indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
 
Results reveal that NONIND explains the variation in IND better than traditional ex post 
measures based on vote shares or margin. This is perhaps not surprising because a 
measure based on vote shares or margin reflects the political strengths after the election. 
NONIND, in contrast, is one variable known before the election and could be a motivating 
factor for strategic entry. Interestingly, a lot of variation in IND over time is due to the high 
number of non-independent candidates in the year 1996. While a simple regression of IND 
on NONIND yields a  of about 0.23, inclusion of a dummy for the 1996 election increases 
it to about 0.75. In contrast, although HHI_AV or MARGIN appears in the equations with the 
correct signs, they are not statistically significant in any of the equations with or without 
dummy. Further, ‘s of the equations involving these variables are also lower compared to 
those involving NONIND. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The paper attempted to examine the nature and the extent of strategic entries of 
independent candidates in elections following FPTP rule. It was observed that under FPTP 
rule, strategic entries of independents might increase with political fragmentation, due to the 
individual incentives of the candidates or due to the incentives of major political parties. In 
the later case, the so called independents could be floated and funded discreetly by political 
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parties to clone their rivals. We observed that in a relatively weak institutional environment, if 
all major political parties engage in this Prisoners' Dilemma type game, the number of 
independent candidates may increase drastically. This later insight also strengthens the 
argument that political fragmentation would lead to the emergence of more independent 
candidates. The paper proposed to use the number of non-independent candidates in a 
constituency as a readily observable ex ante proxy for political fragmentation and studied the 
functional relationship between non-independent and independent candidates in elections 
following FPTP rule. 
Our empirical results involving all parliamentary elections in India since 1962 revealed the 
evolution of the relationship between average number of non-independent and independent 
candidates across constituencies and over time. During the first four elections in our 
reference period (e.g., during 1962—1977), the functional relationship between non-
independent and independent candidates was weak. Many independent candidates during 
this period were regional feudal satraps who either participated in elections with Congress 
support or posed the only challenge to Congress in their locality. During the benchmark 
election of 1977, the first formidable coalition against congress was formed. However, the 
coalition that subsequently came to power was not stable. Subsequent political 
fragmentation and bitter fight among political parties that started during the 1980s to gain 
space gave birth to a new class of independents whose entries into the elections were 
primarily strategic in nature.  
We now discuss a few limitations of this study. First, it may be noted that in this paper we 
have not attempted to explain variations of independent candidates at the constituency level. 
While aggregation for specific number of non-independent candidates in constituencies 
provides a useful summarized picture of variation in independent candidates, the cost is the 
loss in terms of details. A possible future study could, therefore, be to study the 
constituency-wise variation in independents over different elections, extending the results 
obtained by Bhattacharya (2010) for the Indian parliamentary election of 2004. 
Second, we have maintained the formal distinction of small parties and independent 
candidates in India. As candidates of many small parties in India behave like independents, 
one may treat them as independents. However, incentives of small parties, especially if they 
float candidates in more than one constituency, may be more general and not necessarily 
focused on a particular constituency. Working with them, therefore, brings many complex 
issues like coalition formation in a democracy.  Still, it is important to examine whether 
including them as independents would change some of the main results reported in this 
paper. Third, a good fit of our model does not identify the root cause of the strategic entry, 
e.g., whether it is at the individual level or whether the entry itself is facilitated by political 
parties. Our theories and results reported in this study are based on incentives rather than 
real-life motives.  
In this context, it would be interesting to study the post-election behaviour of independent 
candidates, especially those who were able to influence the political outcome through 
participation. Ideally, one should monitor the evolution of their professional achievements, 
finances and politics to study what kind of rents they could extract from major political 
parties. It may be noted that such a study on any country following FPTP electoral rule would 
help us to understand the nature of the long-run pay-off of independent candidates. In 
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particular, in the Indian context, it is important to study whether and if so, to what extent 
political mobilization during the 1970s in India enticed the earlier independent candidates to 
join mainstream political parties.  
Finally, on a general note, the problem addressed in this paper and the policy implications 
are relevant for all democracies with an FPTP electoral system in place. The process of 
globalization and emergence of multicultural societies in many old and established 
democracies in recent years may lead to multiple cleavages in their polity. In such situations, 
competition among the mainstream parties may create a political vacuum leading to the 
emergence of smaller parties (e.g., Liberal Democrats in case of the UK) or independent 
candidates (e.g., Ross Perot in case of the US). If institutional structures in democracies 
allow this trend to continue, our results suggest that such situations could lead to the 
emergence of more independent candidates, enhancing the complexity of political 
management. In extreme case, some of these independent candidates could be floated 
discreetly by the mainstream political parties to gain electoral advantage.  Because of the 
nature of the incentives of political parties, FPTP electoral systems are especially 
susceptible to such phenomena.  Such electoral systems, therefore, need to put appropriate 
institutional constraints in place by increasing the transaction costs of smaller parties and 
independent candidates. 
The Indian experience studied in this paper, however, proves the important role policy 
intervention can play in the emergence of independent candidates. The fact that the number 
of independent candidates in India dropped sharply since 1998 can only be explained in 
terms of the effective interventions by the Election Commission of India that increased the 
transaction costs of the independent candidates. However, since 1998 the number of 
independent candidates per constituency in India once again shows an increasing trend. 
Therefore, the need to study regulations and best country practices that could control or limit 
unsavoury political behaviour of independent candidates is very much in vogue. 
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Appendix A:  Influence of Independent Candidates 
 
Table A.1: Influence of Independent Candidates in Parliamentary 
Elections in India 
  
  
Year INDPER INFLUENCE1 INFLUENCE2 CONSTITUENCIES HHI MARGIN (%) 
1962 11.05 140 143 495 0.380 14.6738 
1967 13.78 243 212 520 0.367 13.7202 
1971 8.38 95 96 518 0.439 23.8536 
1977 5.50 55 62 542 0.496 29.3288 
1980 6.43 95 113 529 0.392 16.8033 
1984 7.92 87 98 514 0.435 20.1743 
1989 5.25 81 98 529 0.416 16.1519 
1991 4.16 49 60 521 0.374 12.9744 
1996 6.28 149 162 543 0.348 11.9748 
1998 2.37 60 55 540 0.385 9.4920 
1999 2.74 64 74 540 0.398 9.8632 
2004 4.25 107 118 543 0.383 12.3933 
2009 5.18 166 169 543 0.347 9.2204 
Notes: 
(i)  INDPER reflects the percentage of votes of independent candidates as a group. 
(ii) INFLUENCE1 reflects the number of constituencies in an election where a single independent candidate got 
more votes than the margin of victory in that constituency.  
(iii) INFLUENCE2 reflects the number of constituencies where independent candidates as a group got more 
votes than the margin of victory. 
(iv) CONSTITUENCIES is the total number of constituencies where election was held. 
(v) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on vote shares in a constituency is the sum of squares of vote share in a 
constituency. HHI for an election in Table A.1 is the average HHI for all such constituencies in that election. 
(vi) MARGIN is the average margin as a percentage of average number of votes polled in a constituency. 
 
 
